

*not used*

Extracts from the memorandum, "EFFORTS FOR PEACE",  
by AYAMARO KONOYE, pp. 104-105.

On the China Incident

1. Prior to my organizing the Cabinet, I had repeated conferences with the Chinese Ambassador accredited to Japan and had exerted myself for the adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations and offered my good offices to the Government, being convinced that Japan and China must be eternal friends and that Japan must help Chiang Kai-shek in his work of unifying China.

2. That a clash should occur between Japan and China soon after my forming a Cabinet, therefore, was farthest from my true wishes. Accordingly, I left no stone unturned in order to save the situation based upon the principle of local settlement and of preventing the spreading of the trouble.

Concerning this situation, three facts must be remembered.

(1) The Japanese Government, far from taking a resolution to start warfare against China, did its utmost to prevent it.

(2) The military itself, although it proposed the sending of troops to China for the protection of the life and property of Japanese residents, always assured that it firmly held to the principle of non-aggrandizement and local settlement.

(3) The results of my efforts to ascertain the policy of the military toward China revealed that at least as far as its leaders were concerned, their policy was not fundamentally different from that of the Government. Consequently I came to the conclusion not that the Government lacked the power to check the military -- under the Constitution, the Government and the military command are mutually independent -- but rather that the military leaders themselves were unable to command the whole military.

3. As the non-aggrandizement policy thus grew gradually untenable and especially when the war spread to Shanghai, I came to think of a resignation of the entire Cabinet to answer for its responsibility, as well as to show that it was contrary to its will. Actually, we gave the matter of resignation serious consideration. However, what would have been the results of the resignation? Is it conceivable that the elements that really led the military, be they the junior officers or the troops on the spot, should have been moved to reflect and to come to act toward the settlement of the disturbed situation? Would there not have been a possibility that they would have set up a puppet government and have led Japan further in a wrong direction?

I felt it my mission, avoiding at all costs further to infuriate the military, to try all available means to check them, and did my utmost accordingly.

It was also to this end that I exerted my utmost to aid the come-back of the KODO (Loyalist) faction. This effort of mine was checked by the military leaders and by certain factions in the Imperial Court.

This being the case, I sincerely regret that I failed to check the military due to my lack of ability, and at the same time I feel a keen sense of responsibility. But I cannot submit myself to an accusation that I, in any sense, approved or supported armed invasion of China.

If I am charged with war crime for the former reason, I have nothing to say; but I am firmly convinced of my innocence if for the latter reason.

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE

We hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written by KONO, Fumimaro personally, entitled "Efforts for Peace" is an exact and authorized excerpt (P.P. 104 - 105) from the book which issued by NIPPON DENPO TSUSHIN SHA, April 1, 1946

certified on this 31 day of January, 1947

NIPPON DENPO TSUSHIN-SHA (seal)

1-147 Ginza Kyobashi-ku, Tokyo

然しつゝ且てどもそは就よ向、師り内とのい闇も力への首  
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然しつゝ且てどもそは みんにとしす。する所の走支、  
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## INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al }

Def. Doc. 2224

Exh. No

近衛文麿手記「平和への努力」第百四頁及第百五頁より抜粋  
支那事變に就て

一 内閣組織前より既に日文那大使と屢々會合し、日支國交調整に奔走、且  
政府に斡旋す。即ち日支永久の友たらざるべからず、我も蔣介石の支那  
統一を支援せざるべからずとの確信を有せり。

二 故に組閣後間もなく日支武力衝突通りたることは最初の意に反する所  
なり。百万局地解決不擴大方針を以て事態を收拾せんと力めたり。

この場合記憶すべき事實は

1 日本内閣としては對支戰爭を決意する所か、極力之を同避せんとす  
2 草自身も在留邦人の生命財産保護を名目に出兵を提案するのみにし  
て、常に不擴大局地解決方式を堅持せる旨を確言す。

3 軍自身の對支方針を明確ならしめんと努力したるも、少なくとも首  
脳部間の意図は内閣と根本的に違反せるものと覺えず、結局内閣の  
軍を抑ふる力足らざりしといふよりは一而も無法上の達前よりいへ  
ば、内閣と統帥とは全然相互に、獨立なり一軍首腦部に軍統帥の力  
なかりしと断ずる方至當なり。

故に不擴大方針漸次敗るゝに及んで、殊に上層に戰局及ぶに至つては  
内閣としては總辭職し以てそれが自らの意に反することを表明し、且そ  
の責を負ふことも考へられ、事實眞剣にこの問題を激討せり、然れども

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3 軍自体の對文方針を明確ならしめんと努力したるも、少なくとも首腦部間の意衝は内閣と根本的に違反せるものと見えず、結局内閣の軍を抑ふる力足らざりしといふよりは一而も法理上の達前よりいへは、内閣と統帥とは全然相互に、獨立なり一軍首腦部に軍統帥の力なかりしと断ずる方至當なり。

故に不擴大方針不擴次敗るゝに及んで、殊に上海に戰局及ぶに至つては内閣としては總辭職し以てそれが自らの意に反することを表明し、且その責を負ふことも考へられ、事實眞剣にこの問題を檢討せり、然れども

總辭職したる結果如何、草を事實上動かせる分子一それが青年將校であれ現地草であれ一が之によつて反省し、事態を收拾する方向に行動せしむらんと考へ得らるゝや、却て傀儡政府を立てゝ事態を日本として譲りたる方向に益々導く可能性なかりしや、余は飽く迄草を激成することを避けながら、極力他の凡ゆる手段により之を制御することを以て余の使命なりと感じて、その努力をなせり、皇道派を復活せしめんと極力努力したるものとの目的の爲なり、この努力は草の首腦部及一部官中勢力によりて阻れたり。故に余の力足らずして遂に草を押ふる能はざりし事實に對しては衷心より之を遺憾とし、且その責任を痛感す。然れども如何なる意味に於ても支那武力侵略を承認乃至支持せりとの糾弾に對しては絶対に之を甘受する能はず。前者の理由によつて戰争犯罪に問はるるならば敵方なきも、後者の故を以てならば余は自己の潔白を確信す。

證 明 書

近衛文麿手記「平和への努力」第百四頁及第百五頁より抜粋と題せる別添文書は昭和二十一年四月一日日本電報通信社より發行せる近衛文麿手記「平和への努力」と題する書籍の當該頁よりの正確なる抜粋なる事を證明す

昭和二十二年一月一日

東京都京橋區銀座一四七ノ一

日本電報通信社